

SIKA BUSINESS YEAR

2024

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BUILDING TRUST





COMPENSATION REPORT

The compensation system is well-balanced and supports long-term value creation for Sika and its stakeholders.

Strategy 2028

COMPENSATION PLANS ALIGNED WITH STRATEGIC TARGETS

ESG Targets

IN BOTH THE STI AND LTI PLANS FOR 2024



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COMPENSATION REPORT

Commitment to openness and transparency

The Compensation Report describes the compensation principles and programs, as well as the governance framework related to the compensation of the Board of Directors and the Members of Sika's Group Management. The report also provides details regarding the compensation programs and the payments made to Members of the Board of Directors and of Group Management in the 2024 business year.

The Compensation Report is written in accordance with the Swiss Code of Obligations, the standard relating to information on Corporate Governance of the SIX Swiss Exchange, and the principles of the Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance by economiesuisse.

Introduction by the Chair of the Nomination and Compensation Committee

Dear Shareholders,

In the name of the Board of Directors and the Nomination and Compensation Committee, I am pleased to introduce the 2024 Compensation Report.

The Compensation Report outlines the compensation principles and programs, along with the governance framework related to the compensation of the Board of Directors and the Group Management. It provides a detailed overview of the compensation awarded to the Members of the Board of Directors and Group Management for the reporting year. Additionally, the report describes how business performance influenced the variable incentive payments awarded to Group Management under the different compensation plans. Overall, Sika maintained its profitable growth trajectory in 2024 even in a challenging economic environment. The total sales figure amounted to CHF 11,763.1 million, a rise of 4.7% in Swiss francs. Sika has also set a record in profit. EBITDA increased over-proportionally by 11.0% to CHF 2,269.5 million (previous year: CHF 2,044.7 million). The EBITDA margin reached 19.3% (previous year: 18.2%). Net profit reached CHF 1,247.6 million which is 17.4% higher than previous year (previous year: CHF 1,062.6 million).

At the 2024 Annual General Meeting on March 26, 2024, Thierry F. J. Vanlancker was elected as Chair of the Board of Directors. Thomas Aebischer was elected as Member of the Board of Directors and was appointed Chair of the Audit Committee. Furthermore, Paul Schuler was elected as Member of the Nomination and Compensation Committee. Additionally, at the 2024 Annual General Meeting, a binding vote on the aggregate maximum compensation amounts for the Board of Directors and for Group Management was conducted, as well as a consultative vote on the Compensation Report, so that shareholders could express their opinion on our compensation policies and principles. The shareholders approved the compensation amounts for the Board of Directors and for Group Management, as well as the consultative vote on the Compensation Report with a very high approval rate.

These positive voting outcomes demonstrate that the company's active dialogue with investors is fruitful and that shareholders endorse the company's compensation system. We would like to thank our investors for their continued trust and support.

In the reporting year, the Nomination and Compensation Committee continued to focus on succession planning for positions on the Board of Directors and Group Management. Further, it performed its regular activities on

compensation matters throughout the year, such as the annual review of the compensation programs, the performance goal-setting and performance assessment of Group Management, the determination of the compensation of the Members of the Board of Directors and Group Management, as well as the preparation of the Compensation Report and of the say-on-pay votes at the Annual General Meeting. In particular, the Nomination and Compensation Committee conducted its annual review of the overall design of the incentive plans and concluded that while the short-term incentive (STI) and long-term incentive (LTI) plans are well aligned with the business strategy, the maximum payout potential of 150% is conservative compared with competitive market practice. In order to encourage and reward strong performance as well as to align with prevailing market practice, the Nomination and Compensation Committee proposes to increase the maximum payout from 150% to 200% for both the STI and LTI. To this effect, the shareholders will be asked to approve a change in the Articles of Association at the Annual General Meeting in 2025. Further information on this change can be found in the respective sections of this Compensation Report. In the context of the annual review of the compensation programs applicable to Group Management, the Nomination and Compensation Committee had decided in 2023 to amend the performance objectives in the incentive plans as of 2024 in order to further strengthen the alignment of the plans with the business and sustainability strategy. First of all, the LTI now includes ESG targets with a weighting of 20%, which consist of a GHG emissions reduction target (Scope 1 and 2), a water discharge reduction target, and a waste disposal reduction target. The other performance indicators continue to be the relative total shareholder return (rTSR) and the return on capital employed (ROCE), each with a weighting of 40%. ROCE is now measured relative to peer companies. Secondly, the STI again includes a people and project target with a weighting of 10%, to replace the GHG emissions reduction target.

Looking ahead, we will continue to assess and review our compensation programs and governance to ensure that they are fulfilling their purpose in the evolving context in which the company operates, especially in attracting and retaining our key talents, and are aligned with the interests of our shareholders. We will also continue to maintain an open dialogue with our shareholders and their representatives. We would like to thank you for sharing your perspectives on executive compensation with us, and trust that you will find this report informative.

Sincerely,

Justin M. Howell
Chair of the Nomination and Compensation Committee

Compensation governance

NOMINATION AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE

In accordance with the Articles of Association and the Organizational Rules of Sika AG, the Nomination and Compensation Committee is composed of three Members of the Board of Directors who are elected individually by the Annual General Meeting for a period of one year. At the Annual General Meeting 2024, Justin M. Howell (Chair), Gordana Landén, and Paul Schuler were elected Members of the Nomination and Compensation Committee. The Nomination and Compensation Committee is a combined Nomination and Compensation committee, the disclosure in this chapter focuses on compensation matters as required by law.

It is the responsibility of the Nomination and Compensation Committee to:

- review and determine the compensation policy, including the principles for variable compensation and shareholding programs according to the provisions specified in the Articles of Association;
- propose to the Board of Directors the maximum aggregate amounts of compensation of the Board of Directors and of Group Management to be submitted to the shareholders' vote at the Annual General Meeting;
- propose to the Board of Directors the compensation level for the Members of the Board of Directors, the CEO, and the other Members of Group Management, within the maximum aggregate compensation amounts approved by the Annual General Meeting;
- provide the Board of Directors with a performance assessment of the CEO and of the other Members of Group Management, together with a recommendation for the short-term and long-term incentives to be awarded to each of them, based on the performance of the Group, its regions, and the individual performance;
- propose to the Board of Directors the Compensation Report;
- prepare the succession planning of the CEO and other Members of Group Management, and propose to the Board of Directors the appointment of new Members of Group Management;
- prepare the succession planning of the Board of Directors and propose to the Board of Directors new candidates to the Board of Directors.

LEVELS OF AUTHORITY

	CEO	BoD Chair	NCC	BoD	AGM
Compensation policy and principles			Proposes	Approves	
Maximum aggregate compensation amounts of BoD and GM			Proposes	Reviews	Approves (binding votes)
Compensation of BoD Chair			Proposes	Approves	
Individual compensation of BoD Members			Proposes	Approves	
Compensation of CEO		Proposes	Reviews	Approves	
Individual compensation of Members of GM	Proposes		Reviews	Approves	
Compensation Report			Proposes	Approves	Consultative vote

CEO = Chief Executive Officer, BoD = Board of Directors, NCC = Nomination and Compensation Committee, AGM = Annual General Meeting, GM = Group Management

In 2024, the Nomination and Compensation Committee held five meetings according to the following predetermined annual agenda.

	Feb	Mar	May	Oct	Dec
Review of overall compensation policy and compensation governance					
Review of external stakeholder feedback on compensation policy and disclosure			■		
Review of overall compensation policy (including benchmarking peer group)			■	■	
Preparation (December) and approval (February of following year) of Compensation Report	■				■
Review of shareholdings of Members of the Board of Directors and Group Management (shareholding ownership guideline)	■				
Preparation of say-on-pay vote for next Annual General Meeting	■				
Review of committee duties, accountabilities, and responsibilities	■				
Approval of meeting schedule of the Nomination and Compensation Committee	■				
Self-assessment by the Nomination and Compensation Committee	■				
Compensation of Board of Directors					
Determination of compensation for following compensation period (AGM to AGM)		■			
Benchmark of compensation of the Board of Directors (every 2-4 years)				■	
Compensation of Group Management					
Preliminary performance evaluation (previous year)	■				
Final performance evaluation (previous year)		■			
Determination of short-term incentive payout for previous year		■			
Determination of long-term incentive vesting (previous performance period)	■				
Preliminary compensation review for following year (including benchmarking analysis every 1-2 years)				■	
Determination of compensation (at target) for following year					■
Determination of performance objectives for following year					■
Nomination items					
Review of Board of Directors constitution			■		
Appraisal and management development plan for Members of Group Management			■	■	
Succession planning for Group Management positions				■	

For details on attendance at meetings, please refer to the Corporate Governance Report on p.180 and 181.

The Chair of the Nomination and Compensation Committee reports to the Board of Directors after each meeting on the activities of the committee. The minutes of the committee meetings are made available to the Members of the Board of Directors. As a general rule, the Chair of the Board of Directors and the CEO attend the meetings in an advisory capacity. They do not attend the meeting when their own compensation and/or performance are being discussed.

The Nomination and Compensation Committee may decide to consult an external advisor from time to time for specific compensation matters. In 2024, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Switzerland provided services related to executive compensation matters. PwC provides other services to Sika, and there are clear rules in place to ensure the independence of PwC consultants. In addition, support and expertise are provided by internal compensation experts, such as the Head Human Resources, Legal & Compliance and the Head Compensation & Benefits.

SHAREHOLDER INVOLVEMENT

The role of the shareholders on compensation matters has gained importance in recent years. First of all, shareholders annually approve the maximum aggregate compensation amounts of the Board of Directors and Group Management. In addition, the principles of compensation are governed by the Articles of Association, which are also approved by the shareholders. The provisions of the Articles of Association on compensation are summarized below (please refer to <https://www.sika.com/en/investors/corporate-governance-risk-management/articles-of-association.html>):

- **Principles of compensation applicable to the Board of Directors** (art. 11.1, 11.3, and 11.8): The Board of Directors receives fixed compensation in cash and/or in shares.
- **Principles of compensation applicable to Group Management** (art. 11.1, 11.4 to 11.6, and 11.8): Group Management receives fixed and variable compensation. The variable compensation consists of a performance bonus paid in cash and of a long-term incentive in the form of equity compensation. For the CEO, the variable compensation (value of paid-out performance bonus and grant value of the long-term incentive) may not exceed 300% of the fixed compensation. For the other Members of Group Management on average, the variable compensation may not exceed 200% of the total fixed compensation. Outlook 2025: At the Annual General Meeting in 2025, the Board of Directors will propose to express the cap on the variable compensation separately for the STI and the LTI plans. The proposed change seeks to better align the interests of shareholders by providing for the flexibility to allocate a higher proportion of compensation to the incentive plans and thus increase the link between compensation and performance. Further, it reflects the market practice in a competitive talent market.
- **Binding vote by the Annual General Meeting** (art. 11.2): The Annual General Meeting annually approves the total fixed compensation amount for the Board of Directors for the period until the next ordinary Annual General Meeting and the maximum total fixed and variable compensation amount for Group Management for the next business year.
- **Additional amount for new Members of Group Management** (art. 11.7): The total additional compensation for each new Member of Group Management may not exceed the average total compensation of Group Management in the previous business year by more than 200%, or 400% in the event of a new election of the CEO. Proven disadvantages from a change of position may be compensated within this additional amount.
- **Pension benefits, loans, and credits** (art. 12): Pension benefits are offered only in accordance with the occupational pension plans, which are specified in the respective regulations. The company does not offer any loans, credits, guarantees, or other securities to Members of the Board of Directors and Group Management.

In addition, the Compensation Report is submitted to a consultative shareholders' vote, so that shareholders can express their opinion on the compensation policy and programs.

METHOD FOR DETERMINING COMPENSATION

PERIODIC BENCHMARKING

The compensation of the Board of Directors is reviewed against prevalent market practice of other multinational industrial companies on a regular basis (every two to four years). In 2023, a thorough review was conducted by PwC to determine the competitiveness of the Board compensation in terms of structure and quantum. For this purpose, a peer group of Swiss multinational companies of the industry sector listed on the SIX Swiss Exchange was selected for the benchmarking analysis. The peer group consists of ABB, Alcon, Barry Callebaut, Geberit, Givaudan, Holcim, Kuehne+Nagel, Lindt, Lonza, Novartis, Richemont, Roche, Schindler, SGS, and Sonova. This group is well-balanced in terms of market capitalization, revenue size, and headcount. The analysis showed that the compensation structure and levels are in line with prevalent market practice.

Regarding the compensation of Group Management, a benchmarking analysis is conducted at least every two years with the support of an independent consultant. This analysis was performed in 2024 by PwC. For the Group Management positions, PwC provided the analysis based on the same peer group of companies as for the compensation review of the Board of Directors. PwC compiled the relevant benchmarking data in a report that served as a basis for the Nomination and Compensation Committee to analyze the compensation of the CEO and Group Management, and to set their target compensation levels for 2025. Sika's policy is to pay market median compensation for solid performance (target compensation) and to provide for compensation above the market median in the event of a strong performance. For newly promoted Members of Group Management, Sika's policy is to set target compensation below the market median and to subsequently increase it to market level over a period of two to three years, conditionally upon solid performance.

PEER GROUP FOR BENCHMARKING PURPOSES

in CHF thousands	Market capitalization (most recent at time of benchmark, 01/09/2024)	Revenue (most recent at time of benchmark, 31/12/2023)	Headcount (most recent at time of benchmark, 31/12/2023)
Sika	43,637	11,239	33,547
Upper quartile	62,466	25,429	75,681
Median	40,129	8,471	33,969
Lower quartile	21,400	6,670	16,934

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

The actual compensation paid to the individual Members of Group Management in a given year depends on the Group, region, and individual performance. Individual performance is assessed through the annual performance management process, which aims to align individual and collective objectives, to stretch performance, and to support personal development. The objectives for a given business year for the CEO and Members of Group Management are approved by the Nomination and Compensation Committee at the end of the previous

business year, and achievement against those objectives is assessed at the beginning of the following year. The performance assessment of the Members of Group Management is conducted by the CEO, while that of the CEO is conducted by the Chair of the Board of Directors. The Nomination and Compensation Committee reviews the performance assessment of the CEO and the other Members of Group Management before submitting them to the Board of Directors for approval. In discussing performance, the Nomination and Compensation Committee reflects on the achievement of the individual objectives of each Member of Group Management. The Nomination and Compensation Committee also considers the extent to which individuals have carried out their duties in line with company values and expected leadership behaviors. The individual performance assessments, together with the Group's performance, form the basis for the determination of incentive payout levels.

COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES

COMPENSATION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

In order to guarantee the independence of the Members of the Board of Directors in exercising their supervisory duties, their compensation consists of fixed remuneration only. The compensation is delivered partially in cash and partially in blocked shares, and shareholding ownership guidelines are in place to strengthen the alignment with shareholders' interests.

COMPENSATION OF GROUP MANAGEMENT

Sika's compensation programs reflect a commitment to attract, develop, and retain qualified, talented, and engaged executives. They are designed to motivate executives to achieve the overall business objectives and to create sustainable shareholder value. The compensation programs are based on the following principles:

PAY FOR PERFORMANCE AND SUSTAINABLE SUCCESS

The compensation of Group Management is linked to Sika's performance (Group and regions) and to individual performance. Through a well-balanced combination of incentive programs, both annual performance and long-term success are rewarded. Furthermore, performance is measured both in absolute terms (year-on-year improvements) and in relative terms (compared to other companies subject to similar market cycles), and includes financial results as well as non-financial objectives, such as sustainability/ESG goals.

ALIGNMENT WITH SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS

A significant portion of compensation is delivered in the form of shares and shareholding ownership guidelines are in place to align the interests of executives with those of the shareholders.

MARKET COMPETITIVENESS

Compensation is regularly benchmarked and is in line with competitive market practice.

TRANSPARENCY

Compensation programs are straightforward and transparent.

The compensation programs include key features that align the interests of executives with those of shareholders and are in line with good practice in corporate governance.

WHAT WE DO

- Conduct an annual review of the compensation policy and programs
- Maintain compensation plans with a strong link between pay and performance
- Conduct a rigorous performance management process
- Maintain compensation plans designed to align executive compensation with long-term shareholder interests
- Require that the Board of Directors, the CEO, and the other Members of Group Management own a minimum number of Sika shares as a percentage of their annual compensation
- Include clawback and malus provisions in the incentives
- Offer employment contracts with a notice period of a maximum of twelve months
- Ensure pay equality and fairness in all countries we operate in

WHAT WE DON'T DO

- ⊗ Provide discretionary compensation payments
- ⊗ Reward inappropriate or excessive risk taking or short-term profit maximization at the expense of the long-term health of the company
- ⊗ Pay dividend equivalents on performance-contingent deferred units that have not been earned yet based on the company's performance
- ⊗ Guarantee future base salary increases or non-performance-based incentive payments
- ⊗ Have prearranged individual severance agreements or special change-of-control compensation agreements

PAY EQUALITY

Sika is committed to pay equality and fairness in all countries the company operates in. The company supports regular internal analysis, where required by law, to ensure that employees are paid fairly and to address any potential pay gap. To facilitate a systematic approach to evaluating pay equality, among other things, the company is continuing the roll-out of standardized job grades, which has been completed in the majority of countries in 2024; remaining ones will be finalized early 2025. This constitutes a prerequisite to enhance fairness, transparency, and gender equality. This approach ensures uniform job evaluation criteria, provides clear progression paths, and promotes pay equity. Following local legislation, Sika has completed equal pay analyses in several countries. Examples are the UK (gender pay gap report), France (gender equality index), and Peru (law No. 30709 prohibiting remunerative discrimination between men and women). Furthermore, in preparation of the EU Pay Transparency Directive, Sika has performed a first pilot in Italy to validate pay equity between male and female employees. The regression analysis, supported by an external tool, was primarily based on employees' education and professional experience, among other criteria, and returned a <5% deviation between the pay of comparable groups of male and female employees.

**EXTERNAL MANDATES****(AUDITED ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 734e OF THE SWISS CODE OF OBLIGATIONS)**

Members of the Board of Directors and Group Management have the following external mandates (if no other specifications are provided, the mandate also applies to the previous year).

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

In 2024	Company	Function
Thierry F. J. Vanlancker	Mandates in listed companies	
	Cabot Corporation, Boston, USA (since July 12, 2024)	Member of the Audit Committee
	Mandates in non-listed companies and organizations	
	Aliaxis Holdings S.A., Brussels, Belgium	Chair of the Board (until July 31, 2024), Managing Director (since August 1, 2024)
Thomas Aebischer	Etex NV, Brussels, Belgium (until December 31, 2024)	Member of the Board
	Stahl Coatings BV, Waalwijk, Netherlands (until December 31, 2024)	Board Advisor
	Mandates in listed companies	
	Solvay SA, Brussels, Belgium	Member of the Board (Chair of the Audit Committee)
Viktor W. Balli	dormakaba Holding AG, Rümlang, Switzerland	Vice Chair of the Board, Member of the Board (Chair of the Audit Committee)
	Mandates in listed companies	
	Givaudan AG, Vernier, Switzerland	Member of the Board (Chair of the Audit Committee and Member of the Compensation Committee)
	Medacta International SA, Castel San Pietro, Switzerland	Member of the Board (Chair of the Audit and Risk Committee)
	KWS Saat SE & Co. KGaA, Einbeck, Germany	Member of the Board (Chair of the Audit Committee)
	Mandates in non-listed companies and organizations	
	Swiss Federal Audit Oversight Authority (RAB), Berne, Switzerland	Member of the Board
Hemro AG, Zurich, Switzerland	Member of the Board	
Lucrèce Foufopoulos-De Ridder	Louis Dreyfus Company International Holding BV, Amsterdam, Netherlands	Member of the Board (Chair of the Audit and Risk Committee)
	Mandates in listed companies	
	Royal Vopak, Rotterdam, Netherlands	Member of the Board (Member of the Audit Committee and Member of the Remuneration Committee)
	Amcor plc, Bristol, United Kingdom	Member of the Board (Member of the Compensation Committee)
Justin M. Howell	Tronox Holdings plc, Stamford, USA (since May 8, 2024)	Member of the Board (Member of the Corporate Governance and Sustainability Committee)
	Quaker Houghton, Conshohocken, USA (since July 31, 2024)	Member of the Board (Member of the Compensation and HR Committee, Member of the Sustainability Committee)
	Mandates in listed companies	
Gordana Landén	Canadian National Railway Company, Montreal, Québec, Canada	Member of the Board (Member of the Governance and Sustainability Committee, Member of the Human Resources and Compensation Committee)
	n/a	n/a

**BOARD OF DIRECTORS**

In 2024	Company	Function
Monika Ribar	Mandates in non-listed companies and organizations SBB AG (Swiss Federal Railways), Berne, Switzerland	Chair of the Board
Paul Schuler	Mandates in non-listed companies and organizations Swisspearl Group AG, Niederurnen, Switzerland	Chair of the Board

GROUP MANAGEMENT

In 2024	Company	Function
Thomas Hasler	Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Zurich, Switzerland (since June 10, 2024)	Member of the Board
Mike Champion	n/a	n/a
Christoph Ganz	n/a	n/a
Patricia Heidtman	Bossard Holding AG, Zug, Switzerland	Member of the Board (Member of the Nomination Committee)
Philippe Jost	Peikko Group, Lahti, Finland	Member of the Board
Raffaella Marzi	Vetropack Holding AG, Bülach, Switzerland	Member of the Board (Chair of the Nomination and Compensation Committee)
Ivo Schädler	n/a	n/a
Adrian Widmer	Sonova Holding AG, Stäfa, Switzerland	Member of the Board (Chair of the Audit Committee)

Architecture of compensation of the Members of the Board of Directors

In order to ensure their independence in exercising their supervisory duties, the Members of the Board of Directors receive fixed compensation only, consisting of a retainer for services to the Board and an additional fee for assignments to committees of the Board, as well as a representation allowance for the Board Chair. The retainer and the committee fees are paid half in cash and half in restricted share units (RSUs), while the representation allowance is paid in cash. The RSUs are granted at the beginning of the term of office and are converted into blocked shares at the end of the term of office. The shares are blocked from trading for a period of three years. The blocking period on the shares may lapse in the event of a change of control or liquidation. The shares remain blocked in all other instances.

The cash compensation is paid shortly after the Annual General Meeting for the previous term of office, being defined as the period between Annual General Meetings, except for the Board Chair, who receives his cash compensation in monthly installments. The Members of the Board of Directors receive no additional reimbursements of business expenses beyond actual expenditures for business travel. The Members of the Board do not participate in Sika's employee benefit plans. There is a legal obligation in Switzerland to offer a minimum pension coverage to Members of the Board of Directors under certain circumstances (for Members of the Board of Directors who are affiliated to the Swiss social security system, who have not reached retirement age, and who are not insured at another company because their mandate on the Sika Board is deemed to be their primary occupation). In such cases, the Member of the Board of Directors bears the entire cost of coverage (employer and employee contributions) by means of a corresponding deduction of the annual Board retainer. The level of coverage does not go beyond the minimum legal obligation. Further, for governance reasons, the pension plan is not part of the Sika occupational benefit plan and is fully outsourced.

STRUCTURE OF BOARD COMPENSATION

in CHF	in cash	in RSUs ¹
Retainer (gross p.a.)		
Board Chair	450,000 + 30,000 allowance	450,000
Board Members	125,000	125,000
Committee fees (gross p.a.)²		
Committee Chair	30,000	30,000
Committee Members	20,000	20,000

1 Converted into RSUs based on the average closing share price in the five first trading days of the month of the beginning of the year of office (month of the Annual General Meeting). The RSUs are settled in shares that are allocated to the Members of the Board of Directors shortly after the end of the year of office.

2 The Board Chair is not eligible for committee fees.

SHAREHOLDING OWNERSHIP GUIDELINE

The Members of the Board of Directors are required to own at least a minimum multiple of their annual Board retainer in Sika shares within five years of their appointment to the Board of Directors (or within five years of the implementation of the guideline), as set out in the table below.

Members of the Board of Directors	200% of annual Board retainer
-----------------------------------	-------------------------------

In the event of a substantial rise or drop in the share price, the Nomination and Compensation Committee may, at its discretion, amend that time period accordingly.

To calculate whether the minimum holding requirement is met, all shares are considered, regardless of whether they are blocked or not. Unvested RSUs do not count. The Nomination and Compensation Committee reviews compliance with the share ownership guideline on an annual basis.

Architecture of compensation of the Members of Group Management

COMPENSATION MODEL AND COMPENSATION ELEMENTS

The compensation for Members of Group Management includes the following elements:

- fixed base salary;
- variable compensation: short-term and long-term incentives;
- benefits and perquisites.

STRUCTURE OF COMPENSATION OF GROUP MANAGEMENT

	Vehicle	Purpose	Drivers	Performance measures
Annual base salary	Monthly cash salary	Attract and retain	Position, market practice, skills, and experience	
Performance bonus (STI)	Annual bonus in cash	Pay for performance	Annual performance	Group EBITDA, Group net sales, safety (reduction of LTA), region/individual goals
Long-term incentive (LTI)	PSU with a 3-year performance vesting	Reward long-term performance Align to shareholders	Business performance over 3 years	Relative ROCE, relative TSR ESG: Scope 1 and 2 reduction, waste reduction per ton sold, water reduction per ton sold
Benefits	Pension and insurances Perquisites	Protect against risks Attract and retain	Market practice and position	

The intended compensation mix at target for Members of Group Management is 40% annual base salary, 30% target STI, and 30% target LTI. For the CEO, the compensation mix is more focused on the variable compensation and currently amounts to 30% annual base salary, 30% target STI, and 40% target LTI.

FIXED ANNUAL BASE SALARY

Annual base salaries are established based on the following factors:

- scope, size, and responsibilities of the role, skills required to perform the role;
- external market value of the role;
- skills, experience, and performance of the individual in the role.

To ensure market competitiveness, base salaries of the Members of Group Management are reviewed every year, taking into consideration the company's capacity to pay, benchmark information, market movement, economic environment, and individual performance.

PERFORMANCE BONUS (SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE)

The performance bonus is a short-term variable incentive, designed to reward the collective performance of the Group and its regions and the individual performance over a time horizon of one year. This variable compensation allows executives to participate in the Group's success while being rewarded for their individual performance.

The performance bonus target (i.e. bonus at 100% target achievement) is reviewed annually and is expressed as a percentage of base salary. It amounts to 100% for the CEO and ranges from 60% to 105% for the other Members of Group Management. For the CEO and the four Members of Group Management with a global role, Group performance accounts for 90% of the performance bonus, while the achievement of individual objectives accounts for 10%. For the other three Members of Group Management responsible for a region, Group performance accounts for 70% of the performance bonus, while the achievement of regional objectives accounts for 20%, and that of individual objectives for 10% of the performance bonus.

GROUP PERFORMANCE

The performance measures for the Group are proposed by the Nomination and Compensation Committee and approved by the Board of Directors. The Group performance is measured in two ways:

- The relative performance of the Group compared to a peer group of companies, accounting for 60% of the performance bonus for all Members of Group Management. The relative performance includes the EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax depreciation, and amortization) improvement during the year with 40% weight and net sales growth during the year with 20% weight;
- The absolute performance of the Group against own-set targets. The absolute performance consists of a safety target with the reduction of lost time accidents (LTA) with a weighting of 10% for all Members of Group Management, as well as an absolute EBITDA target at Group level, with a weighting of 20%, for all Members of Group Management with a global role (functional roles).

RELATIVE GROUP PERFORMANCE

Relative EBITDA and net sales performance are measured based on an evaluation provided by an independent consulting firm, Obermatt. This benchmark compares and ranks Sika against the performance of a selected peer group of 22 companies, all industrial firms which were chosen because they have a comparable base of products, technology, customers, suppliers, or investors, and are thus exposed to similar market cycles.

PEER GROUP (OBERMATT BENCHMARK)


- | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| – 3M – Safety and Industrial | – Henkel-Adhesive Technologies |
| – Arkema – Adhesive Solutions | – Hilti Corporation ¹ |
| – Armstrong World Industries Inc. | – Holcim – Solutions & Products |
| – Ashland | – Huntsman – Performance Products |
| – Beacon Roofing Supply, Inc. | – Owens Corning |
| – Beiersdorf – Tesa | – Pidilite Industries Limited |
| – Carlisle Construction Materials | – RPM |
| – EMS-Chemie Holding AG | – Saint-Gobain |
| – Forbo-Flooring Systems | – SK Kaken Co., Ltd. |
| – H.B. Fuller Company | – Sto AG |
| – Geberit | – Uzin Utz AG |

¹ Hilti is not listed on the stock market and is therefore not included for the relative TSR in the long-term incentive plan.

The intention is to reward Group Management based on the relative performance of the Group, because absolute performance may be strongly impacted by market factors that are outside the control of management.

For both EBITDA and net sales improvements, the objective is to reach the median performance of the peer group, which corresponds to a 100% payout factor. There is no payout for any performance below the lowest quartile of the peer group. Performance at the lowest quartile of the peer group corresponds to a payout factor of 50%. Performance at the uppermost quartile leads to a 150% payout factor, and being the best in the peer group leads to a 200% payout factor. Any payout factor between those levels is interpolated linearly.

Payout curve for the Obermatt benchmark



ABSOLUTE GROUP PERFORMANCE

The safety objective recognizes the importance of Sika's employees' safety. It is an objective to promote a safety culture and to reduce accidents by increasing safety measures. For 2024, the objective was to achieve a reduction of the Lost Time Accident (LTA) rate by 10% compared to 2023.

The Group EBITDA objective is measured as a year-on-year improvement. For 2024, the objective was to improve Group EBITDA by 10% compared to 2023.

REGION AND INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE

The region and individual performance includes performance objectives that are set as part of the annual performance management process. For the CEO and for the other Members of Group Management, they are reviewed and approved by the Nomination and Compensation Committee.

Region performance (20% of the overall performance bonus) includes performance objectives linked to the region under responsibility. These objectives either contribute to the top-line growth, bottom-line profitability, or the efficient management of the company's capital. In 2024, the Nomination and Compensation Committee decided to focus on EBITDA (expressed as an improvement versus previous year).

Individual performance (reintroduced in 2024 with a weighting of 10% of the overall performance bonus in 2024, compared to 0% in 2023) includes performance objectives in the area of people management or key projects (People & Projects). In 2024, the people & projects objectives for the CEO were the implementation of the Strategy 2028, which focuses on sustainable growth and increasing company value based on four key pillars: Market Penetration, Innovation & Sustainability, Acquisitions, and People & Culture, as well as the integration of the MBCC Group. The people & projects objectives for other members of Group management also included the integration of MBCC Group, as well as goals around efficiency initiatives and talent development.

At the beginning of the following year, the actual performance achievement is compared with the objectives that were set for the business year. The level of achievement for each objective corresponds to a payout percentage for that objective, which is always between 0% and 200%.

Overview of performance objectives and respective weighting

				CEO, Corporate functions	Regional heads
Performance bonus	← Group performance	← Relative to peer group	← EBITDA improvement	40%	40%
			← Net sales growth	20%	20%
	←	← Absolute	← Safety: accident reduction	10%	10%
	←		← EBITDA Group	20%	
	← Region performance	← Absolute	← EBITDA region		20%
	← Individual performance	← Absolute	← People & Projects	10%	10%

The overall bonus payout is capped and cannot exceed 150% of the performance bonus target. The performance bonus is paid out in March of the following year.

OUTLOOK

For 2025, it is proposed to remove the overall cap of 150% on the performance bonus to encourage and reward strong performance and to align with prevailing market practice. This means that the payout curve for each KPI will remain unchanged with a cap at 200% and that the performance bonus will be capped at 200% as well. The proposed change is subject to the approval of the corresponding change in the Articles of Association at the Annual General Meeting in 2025.

**LONG-TERM INCENTIVE (LTI)**

Sika's compensation policy is designed to also align a significant portion of compensation of Group Management to the Group's long-term performance and to strengthen Group Management's alignment with shareholders' interests. The LTI target is reviewed annually and amounts to 133% of the annual base salary for the CEO, and ranges from 60% to 105% for the other Members of Group Management.

The LTI plan is a performance share unit (PSU) plan. At the beginning of the vesting period, a number of PSUs are granted to each Member of Group Management. The PSUs vest after a period of three years, conditionally upon fulfilling the following performance conditions, the relative ROCE with a weight of 40%, relative TSR with a weighting of 40%, and ESG targets (Scope 1 and 2 reduction) with a weighting of 10%, waste reduction per ton sold with a weighting of 5%, and water reduction per ton sold with a weighting of 5%. Both, the relative ROCE and the relative TSR are measured in relation to a peer group as a percentile rank, and the objective is to reach the median of the peer group. The peer group consists of all companies of the peer group used for the performance bonus as disclosed on p.192, with one exception: Hilti is not listed on the stock market and is therefore not included for the relative TSR in the LTI.


For each performance condition, the maximum achievement level is capped at 200%; however, the overall vesting level for the LTI is capped at 150%. The final share allocation is determined after the three-year performance period, based on the following vesting rules:

Performance measures	Relative ROCE (2024–2026)	Relative TSR (2024–2026)	ESG (2024–2026)
Purpose	Rewards the efficient management of the company's capital	Aligns executive compensation with shareholders' returns	Recognizes the importance of mitigating the company's impact on the environment
Weighting	40% of the PSU grant	40% of the PSU grant	20% of the PSU grant: 10% Scope 1 and 2 reduction 5% waste reduction per ton sold 5% water reduction per ton sold
Target level	Relative ROCE at the median of the peer group 100% payout	Relative TSR at the median of the peer group 100% payout	Scope 1 and 2 reduction: -2% vs. PY ¹ Waste reduction per ton sold: -3% vs. PY Water reduction per ton sold: -3% vs. PY
Maximum payout level	200%	200%	200%
	Combined maximum payout capped at 150%		
Vesting rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Threshold: 25th percentile = 50% payout – Target: median = 100% payout – Maximum: best of all peers = 200% payout – Linear interpolation between threshold, target, and maximum 		Scope 1 and 2 reduction: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Threshold: PY = 50% payout – Target: -2% vs. PY = 100% payout – Maximum: -5% vs. PY = 200% payout Waste and water reduction: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Threshold: -2% vs. PY = 50% payout – Target: -3% vs. PY = 100% payout – Maximum: -5% vs. PY = 200% payout

¹ PY = Performance Year

The shares are allocated at their market value (closing price at grant date on the SIX Swiss Exchange), in the month of the AGM in the year following the three-year vesting period. In some countries where the allocation of shares may be illegal or impractical, the award may be settled in cash after the performance period.

Long-term incentive plan period



In the event of termination of employment, the unvested PSUs are forfeited except in case of retirement, disability, death, change of control, or liquidation. In the event of termination due to retirement or disability, the unvested PSUs vest at the normal vesting date, prorated for the number of months that have expired from the grant date until the termination date and based on the effective performance. In the event of a termination of employment due to death, liquidation, or a change of control, unvested PSUs are subject to accelerated vesting, prorated for the number of months that have expired from the grant date until the termination date and based on an achievement of 100%.

Termination of employment (resignation, involuntary termination, etc.)	Retirement and disability	Death, liquidation, or change of control
Forfeiture of unvested PSUs	Unvested PSUs vest at the regular date prorated for the number of months that have expired from the grant date until the termination date and based on the effective performance.	Unvested PSUs are subject to accelerated vesting, prorated for the number of months that have expired from the grant date until the termination date and based on an achievement of 100%.

OUTLOOK

For 2025, it is proposed to remove the overall cap of 150% on the LTI to encourage and reward strong performance and to align with prevailing market practice. This means that the payout curve for each KPI will remain unchanged with a cap at 200% and that the LTI will be capped at 200% as well. This is in line with the compensation philosophy of the company to align pay with performance and to keep the incentive plan leverage at a reasonable level while at the same time ensuring it is in line with prevailing market practice.

CLAWBACK AND MALUS PROVISIONS

Clawback and malus provisions apply to both the performance bonus and the long-term incentive plan. In the case of financial restatement due to non-compliance with accounting standards or fraud, and/or in the case of violation of law or of internal rules by a Member of Group Management, the Board of Directors may deem any performance bonus payment and/or unvested PSUs to be forfeited (malus provision), or may seek reimbursement of any paid performance bonus and/or allocated shares under the long-term incentive (clawback provision) within a period of three years after the year of restatement or of the fraudulent/non-compliant behavior.

SHAREHOLDING OWNERSHIP GUIDELINE

The Members of Group Management are required to own at least a minimum multiple of their annual base salary in Sika shares within five years of their appointment to Group Management, as set out in the table below.

CEO	500% of annual base salary
Members of Group Management	200% of annual base salary

In the event of a substantial rise or drop in the share price, the Board of Directors may, at its discretion, amend that time period accordingly.

To calculate whether the minimum holding requirement is met, all vested shares are considered, regardless of whether they are blocked or not. However, unvested PSUs are excluded. The Nomination and Compensation Committee reviews compliance with the share ownership guideline on an annual basis.

**BENEFITS: PENSIONS**

As Group Management is international in its nature, the members participate in the benefits plans available in the country of their employment contract. Benefits consist mainly of retirement, insurance, and healthcare plans that are designed to provide a reasonable level of protection for the employees and their dependents in respect to the risk of retirement, disability, death, and illness. The Members of Group Management with a Swiss employment contract participate in Sika's pension plans offered to all employees in Switzerland. These consist of the pension fund of Sika ("Pensionskasse Sika"), in which base salaries up to an amount of CHF 147,000 per annum are insured, as well as a supplementary plan, in which base salaries in excess of this limit are insured up to the maximum amount permitted by law. Sika's pension funds exceed the legal requirements of the Swiss Federal Law on Occupational Retirement, Survivors, and Disability Pension Plans (BVG). Members of Group Management under foreign employment contracts are insured commensurately with market conditions and with their position. Each plan varies in line with the local competitive and legal environment and, at a minimum, in accordance with the legal requirements of the respective country.

Moreover, an early retirement plan is in place for members of the top management of Sika. The plan, entirely financed by the employer, is administered by a Swiss foundation. Beneficiaries may opt for early retirement from the age of 60, provided that they have been in a top management position for at least five years. Benefits under the plan are twofold:

- Fixed pension payment until the age of legal retirement. The amount of pension depends on the last fixed salary and the actual age at early retirement.
- Partial financing of the reduction in the regular pension due to early retirement. The amount, which may be received as a life-long pension payment or as a capital contribution, depends on the actual age at early retirement and benefits already accrued in existing pension plans. This portion of the plan is only applicable to beneficiaries insured under a Swiss pension plan.

BENEFITS: PERQUISITES

Members of Group Management are also provided with certain executive perquisites, such as a company car allowance and other benefits in kind, according to competitive market practice in their country of employment. The monetary value of these other elements of compensation is evaluated at fair value and is included in the compensation tables below.

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

The Members of Group Management are employed under employment contracts of unlimited duration and are all subject to a notice period of one year. Members of Group Management are not contractually entitled to termination payments, or any change of control provisions, other than the early vesting of PSUs mentioned above. Their contract may foresee non-competition provisions that are limited in time to a maximum of two years and which allow compensation up to a maximum of six months.



Compensation awarded to the Board of Directors in 2024

This section is audited according to art. 734a-f of the Swiss Code of Obligations.

In 2024, Members of the Board of Directors received a total compensation of CHF 3.3 million (2023: CHF 3.1 million) in the form of a retainer in cash of CHF 1.4 million (2023: CHF 1.3 million), committee fees in cash of CHF 0.2 million (2023: CHF 0.2 million), social security contributions of CHF 0.1 million (2023: CHF 0.1 million), and RSUs of CHF 1.6 million (2023: CHF 1.5 million). The compensation remained stable compared to the previous year.

COMPENSATION AWARDED TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

in CHF	Cash		Value of RSUs ¹		Social security ²	Total 2023	Cash		Value of RSUs ¹		Social security ²	Total 2024
	Retainer	Committee fees	Retainer	Committee fees			Retainer	Committee fees	Retainer	Committee fees		
Thierry F. J. Vanlancker, Board Chair ³	125,000	50,000	125,078	50,031	0	350,109	401,667	16,667	379,368	16,679	7,720	822,101
Paul Hälgi, former Board Chair ⁴	480,000	0	450,201	0	7,720	937,921	160,000	0	150,087	0	7,720	317,808
Thomas Aebischer, AC Chair ⁵							93,750	22,500	93,886	22,533	7,720	240,389
Viktor W. Balli, AC Member, SC Member	125,000	40,000	125,126	40,040	7,720	337,887	125,000	40,000	125,038	40,012	7,720	337,771
Lucrèce Foufopoulos-De Ridder, SC Chair	125,000	40,000	125,126	40,040	7,720	337,887	125,000	32,500	125,170	32,544	7,720	322,934
Justin M. Howell, NCC Chair	125,000	30,000	125,180	30,043	0	310,224	125,000	30,000	125,183	30,044	0	310,227
Gordana Landén, NCC Member	125,000	20,000	125,092	20,015	7,720	297,827	125,000	20,000	125,125	20,020	7,720	297,866
Monika Ribar, AC Member	125,000	30,000	125,180	30,043	7,720	317,944	125,000	22,500	125,167	22,531	7,720	302,918
Paul Schuler, NCC Member, SC Member	125,000	0	125,118	0	7,720	257,838	125,000	30,000	125,036	30,001	7,720	317,758
Total	1,355,000	210,000	1,326,101	210,213	46,320	3,147,636	1,405,417	214,167	1,374,061	214,363	61,763	3,269,771

AC = Audit Committee, NCC = Nomination and Compensation Committee, SC = Sustainability Committee

¹ Fair market value is defined as the average closing price of the first five trading days in March before the beginning of the year of office.

² Includes social security contributions to the extent that they result in a benefit entitlement. Additional contributions that do not result in an increase of the benefit entitlement are excluded (additional contributions in the amount of CHF 141,091 in 2024 and CHF 122,345 in 2023 are excluded from the amount disclosed above).

³ Board Chair since AGM of March 26, 2024, board member previously.

⁴ Until AGM of March 26, 2024.

⁵ Since AGM of March 26, 2024.



The compensation disclosed in the Compensation Report always includes the respective calendar year (January to December). However, shareholders approve the compensation to be paid for the period between Annual General Meetings. The compensation paid for the periods between Annual General Meetings is disclosed below, including a comparison with the compensation amount approved by the shareholders.

At the Annual General Meeting on March 26, 2024, shareholders approved an aggregate maximum compensation amount of CHF 3,400,000 for the Board of Directors for the term of office from the 2024 Annual General Meeting until the 2025 Annual General Meeting. The compensation effectively paid for the portion of this term of office included in this Compensation Report and is within the limit approved by the shareholders. A conclusive assessment for the entire period will be included in the Compensation Report 2025.

At the Annual General Meeting on March 28, 2023, shareholders approved an aggregate maximum compensation amount of CHF 3,400,000 for the Board of Directors for the term of office from the 2023 Annual General Meeting until the 2024 Annual General Meeting. The compensation effectively paid to the Board of Directors for this term was CHF 3,155,429 and is therefore within the approved limits.

In the year under review, no compensation was paid to former Members of the Board of Directors. No compensation was paid to parties closely related to Members of the Board of Directors.

In accordance with the Articles of Association, loans to Members of the Board of Directors are not permitted. Hence, no Member of the Board of Directors was granted a loan during the reporting year. No loans were outstanding at the end of the year under review.

Compensation awarded to the CEO and to Group Management in 2024

This section is audited according to art. 734a-f of the Swiss Code of Obligations.

For 2024, the Members of Group Management received a total compensation of CHF 19.9 million (2023: CHF 17.1 million). This amount comprises fixed salaries of CHF 5.9 million (2023: CHF 5.4 million), short-term bonuses of CHF 6.9 million (2023: CHF 6.1 million), long-term incentives of CHF 4.9 million (2023: CHF 3.6 million), other expenses of CHF 0.5 million (2023: 0.5 million), contributions to social security of CHF 0.1 million (2023: CHF 0.1 million), and post-employment contributions of CHF 1.5 million (2023: CHF 1.4 million).

The highest-paid individual in 2024 was Thomas Hasler, Group CEO.

in CHF thousands (gross) ¹	CEO 2023	Total 2023 ²	CEO 2024	Total 2024 ³
Fixed base salary ⁴	1,250	5,377	1,350	5,910
Performance bonus (STI) cash ⁵	1,875	6,158	2,025	6,915
Long-term incentive (LTI) ⁶	1,082	3,559	1,744	4,946
Other payments ⁷	46	523	94	459
Social security ⁸	12	116	12	143
Pension contributions ⁹	270	1,381	205	1,513
Total	4,535	17,114	5,431	19,886

1 All compensation amounts are stated gross.

2 On the basis of eight Members, all of whom served during the full year in 2023.

3 On the basis of eight Members, all of whom served during the full year in 2024.

4 Includes annual base salary and children/family allowances.

5 Estimated performance bonus (STI) for the reporting year that will be paid in April of the following year.

6 Grant value of the LTI in the reporting year. The grant value is based on the Monte Carlo evaluation of the PSU (due to the interdependency of the TSR and ROCE component).

7 Includes all other benefits in kind, and perquisites at fair value such as service anniversary payments, including cost allowances (tax equalization, housing, schooling, home leave) for the international assignees and international transfers.

8 Includes social security contributions to the extent that they result in a pension entitlement. Additional contributions that do not result in an increase of the pension entitlement are excluded (additional contributions excluded from the amount above in 2024: CHF 1,054,870, of which CHF 352,006 relates to the CEO; in 2023: CHF 887,613, of which CHF 285,456 relates to the CEO).

9 Includes contributions to company-provided pension plans, including the service cost to the pre-retirement plan.



Explanatory comments to the compensation table:


- There were eight Members in Group Management in 2024, all of whom served on a full-year basis. This compares to eight Members in 2023, of whom all served on a full-year basis.
- The compensation increased overall compared to the previous year. The compensation of the CEO was increased, which is in line with the company's policy to set target compensation of newly promoted members below the market median at the time of promotion and subsequently increase it to market level over a reasonable period of time. Members of Group Management who have been promoted in recent years received an increase in compensation, most of which was provided in LTI, in line with this policy.
- The "other" payments decreased slightly compared to the previous year, as the long-service anniversary payments and the cost allowances related to international transfers decreased.
- The performance achievement under the performance bonus was higher in 2024 than in 2023. Further details are provided below.
- The grant value of the long-term incentive has increased by 39% compared to the previous year, driven by the rationale mentioned above regarding compensation increase for newly promoted members of the Group Management.
- The social security contributions increased slightly, driven by the overall compensation increase compared to previous year.
- The pension contributions increased slightly compared to the previous year, which is due to the fact that 80% of the performance bonus target is newly insured. The contribution rates in the pension plan have not changed significantly for several years.
- The variable compensation amounted to 279% of the annual base salary or 227% of the fixed compensation (annual base salary plus contributions to social security and pension plus other payments) for the CEO, and to 177% of the annual base salary, or 127% of the fixed compensation for the other Members of Group Management on average.

The total amount of compensation of CHF 19.9 million awarded to Group Management in 2024 is below the maximum aggregate amount of compensation of CHF 21.5 million approved by the shareholders at the 2023 Annual General Meeting for the business year 2024.

PERFORMANCE IN 2024 (NOT AUDITED)

In the performance bonus, Sika outperformed the peer companies in terms of net sales growth (ranked sixth, payout of 160%), and EBITDA improvement year on year (ranked sixth, payout of 152%) (best estimate at the time of publication; the relative performance factors will be calculated by Obermatt based on the annual report publications of the peer companies before the payout date in March 2025). The accident rate reduction was 37.0%, which provides for a payout of 200.0%. Group EBITDA was 11% above previous year, which corresponds to a payout factor of 120%. This compares to a solid year 2023, where Sika outperformed its peers on net sales growth (ranked 1st with a 200% payout), outperformed the industry average in terms of EBIT improvement year on year (ranked 12th with a payout of 100.2%) and with an accident rate reduction of 23.6% (with a payout of 169.5%).

Region/individual performance, which is measured by EBITDA and people & projects objectives, ranges from 66.7% to 150%. Consequently, the overall bonus payout percentage ranges from 132.8% to 150% (cap) for Members of Group Management and amounts to 150% (cap) for the CEO. This compares to a payout range of 137.0% to 150% for Group Management and to a payout of 147% for the CEO for 2023.



In accordance with the LTI 2024–2026, 21,277 PSUs were granted to the Members of Group Management. Those PSUs had an overall grant value of CHF 4.9 million and will vest on December 31, 2026, based on the relative ROCE performance, and on the relative TSR performance during 2024–2026, the ESG targets (Scope 1 and 2 reduction), waste reduction per ton sold and water reduction per ton sold during 2024–2026, and upon the continuous employment of the participant.

In the LTI that vested in 2024 (LTI 2022–2024), the performance condition of 25% average ROCE over the vesting period was partially achieved: the average three-year ROCE, excluding acquisitions, amounts to 23.0%, leading to a payout of 67.4%. Regarding the second performance condition, relative TSR, Sika outperformed 46.0% of the peer companies, leading to a payout of 92.0%. Therefore, the combined vesting level amounts to 79.7% and the 10,556 units granted to the current Members of Group Management have vested into 8,413 shares (10,556 PSUs granted, multiplied by the vesting level of 79.7%) with a vesting value of CHF 1.8 million. The value at vesting is lower than the value at grant due to the vesting level below 100% and the negative development in the share price during the vesting period (2022–2024).

**OVERVIEW OF THE OUTSTANDING PSU GRANTS
(INCLUDES MEMBERS OF GROUP MANAGEMENT AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2023)**

Plan		Grant date (PSU)	Performance period	Vesting date (PSUs)	Number of PSUs granted	Total value at grant (CHF)	Vesting level in % of grant	Number of shares (vesting)	Total value at vesting (CHF)
LTI 2022	Group Mgt (incl. CEO)	01/01/2022	2022–2024	12/31/2024	10,556	3,856,529	79.7%	8,413	1,815,554
	CEO	01/01/2022	2022–2024	12/31/2024	3,152	1,151,552	79.7%	2,512	542,121
LTI 2023	Group Mgt (incl. CEO)	01/01/2023	2023–2025	12/31/2025	17,220	3,558,857 ¹	To be determined	To be determined	To be determined
	CEO	01/01/2023	2023–2025	12/31/2025	5,236	1,082,124 ¹	To be determined	To be determined	To be determined
LTI 2024	Group Mgt (incl. CEO)	01/01/2024	2024–2026	12/31/2026	21,277	4,946,264	To be determined	To be determined	To be determined
	CEO	01/01/2024	2024–2026	12/31/2026	7,501	1,743,757	To be determined	To be determined	To be determined

¹ The total value at grant (in CHF) was incorrectly disclosed with 4,111,103 for the Group Management (incl. CEO) and with 1,250,043 for the CEO in the Compensation Report 2023.

In the year under review, no compensation was paid to former Members of Group Management. Further, no compensation was paid to parties closely related to Members of Group Management.

In accordance with the Articles of Association, loans to Members of the Group Management are not permitted. Hence, no Member of Group Management was granted a loan during the reporting year. No loans were outstanding at the end of the year under review.

Shareholdings and outstanding RSUs and PSUs of the Members of the Board of Directors and Group Management in 2024

This section is audited according to art. 734d of the Swiss Code of Obligations.

At the end of 2024, Members of the Board of Directors held a total of 118,094 shares of Sika AG (2023: 175,998). At the end of 2024, Members of Group Management held a total of 131,589 shares of Sika AG (2023: 119,943). This figure includes both privately acquired shares and those allocated under the Group's compensation schemes. Furthermore, at the end of 2024, Members of the Board of Directors held a total of 5,968 RSUs (2023: 5,869). At the end of 2024, Members of Group Management held a total of 49,053 PSUs at target (2023: 39,429).

Participation	2023		2024	
	Total number of shares	Total number of RSUs	Total number of shares	Total number of RSUs
Board of Directors				
Thierry F. J. Vanlancker, Board Chair	3,850	669	4,519	1,749
Paul Halg, former Board Chair	59,019	1,720	n/a	n/a
Thomas Aebischer, AC Chair	n/a	n/a	0	603
Viktor W. Balli, AC Member, SC Member	2,658	631	3,289	641
Lucrece Foufopoulos-De Ridder, SC Chair	532	631	1,163	603
Justin M. Howell, NCC Chair	2,976	593	3,569	603
Gordana Landen, NCC Member	738	554	1,292	564
Monika Ribar, AC Member	9,286	593	9,879	564
Paul Schuler, NCC Member, SC Member	96,939	478	94,383	641
Total	175,998	5,869	118,094	5,968

Participation	2023		2024	
	Total number of shares	Total number of PSUs (at target) ¹	Total number of shares	Total number of PSUs (at target) ²
Group Management				
Thomas Hasler, Chief Executive Officer	33,751	11,166	38,294	15,889
Mike Campion, Regional Manager Americas	10,849	3,744	12,599	4,227
Christoph Ganz, Regional Manager EMEA	20,901	4,650	23,046	5,135
Patricia Heidtman, Chief Innovation and Sustainability Officer	891	1,859	891	3,360
Philippe Jost, Regional Manager Asia/Pacific	4,134	3,631	5,828	3,970
Raffaella Marzi, Head Human Resources, Legal & Compliance	1,783	2,545	2,658	3,443
Ivo Schadler, Head Construction	12,797	4,250	12,000	4,246
Adrian Widmer, Chief Financial Officer	34,837	7,584	36,273	8,783
Total	119,943	39,429	131,589	49,053

¹ Outstanding units at target from the LTI 2021–2023, LTI 2022–2024, and LTI 2023–2025

² Outstanding units at target from the LTI 2022–2024, LTI 2023–2025, and LTI 2024–2026

EQUITY OVERHANG AND DILUTION AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2024

In total as of December 31, 2024, the equity overhang, defined as the total number of share units and blocked shares outstanding divided by the total number of outstanding shares (160,479,293 registered shares), amounts to 226,389 units, or 0.14%.

The company's "burn rate", defined as the number of equities (shares and share units) granted in 2024 (106,615 units) divided by the total number of outstanding shares, is 0.07%.



Report of the statutory auditor

To the General Meeting of Sika AG, Baar

Report on the Audit of the Compensation Report

Opinion

We have audited the Compensation Report of Sika AG (the Company) for the year ended 2024. The audit was limited to the information pursuant to Art. 734a-734f of the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO) in the sections "External Mandates", "Compensation awarded to the Board of Directors in 2024", "Compensation awarded to the CEO and to Group Management 2024" and "Shareholdings and outstanding RSUs and PSUs of the members of the Board of Directors and Group Management in 2024" on pages 187 to 204 of the Compensation Report.

In our opinion, the information pursuant to Art. 734a-734f CO in the Compensation Report complies with Swiss law and the Company's articles of incorporation.

Basis for Opinion

We conducted our audit in accordance with Swiss law and Swiss Standards on Auditing (SA-CH). Our responsibilities under those provisions and standards are further described in the "Auditor's Responsibilities for the Audit of the Compensation Report" section of our report. We are independent of the Company in accordance with the provisions of Swiss law and the requirements of the Swiss audit profession, and we have fulfilled our other ethical responsibilities in accordance with these requirements.

We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion.

Other Information

The Board of Directors is responsible for the other information. The other information comprises the information included in the annual report, but does not include the audited sections in the Compensation Report, the consolidated financial statements, the stand-alone financial statements and our auditor's reports thereon.

Our opinion on the Compensation Report does not cover the other information and we do not express any form of assurance conclusion thereon.

In connection with our audit of the Compensation Report, our responsibility is to read the other information and, in doing so, consider whether the other information is materially inconsistent with the audited financial information in the Compensation Report or our knowledge obtained in the audit or otherwise appears to be materially misstated.



If, based on the work we have performed, we conclude that there is a material misstatement of this other information, we are required to report that fact. We have nothing to report in this regard.

Board of Directors' Responsibilities for the Compensation Report

The Board of Directors is responsible for the preparation of a Remuneration Report in accordance with the provisions of Swiss law and the Company's articles of incorporation, and for such internal control as the Board of Directors determines is necessary to enable the preparation of a Remuneration Report that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error. The Board of Directors is also responsible for designing the remuneration system and defining individual remuneration packages.

Auditor's Responsibilities for the Audit of the Compensation Report

Our objectives are to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the information pursuant to Art. 734a-734f CO is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, and to issue an auditor's report that includes our opinion. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but is not a guarantee that an audit conducted in accordance with Swiss law and SA-CH will always detect a material misstatement when it exists. Misstatements can arise from fraud or error and are considered material if, individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of this Compensation Report.

As part of an audit in accordance with Swiss law and SA-CH, we exercise professional judgement and maintain professional skepticism throughout the audit. We also:

- Identify and assess the risks of material misstatement in the Compensation Report, whether due to fraud or error, design and perform audit procedures responsive to those risks, and obtain audit evidence that is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion. The risk of not detecting a material misstatement resulting from fraud is higher than for one resulting from error, as fraud may involve collusion, forgery, intentional omissions, misrepresentations, or the override of internal control.
- Obtain an understanding of internal control relevant to the audit in order to design audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the Company's internal control.
- Evaluate the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the reasonableness of accounting estimates and related disclosures made.

We communicate with the Board of Directors or its relevant committee regarding, among other matters, the planned scope and timing of the audit and significant audit findings, including any significant deficiencies in internal control that we identify during our audit.

We also provide the Board of Directors or its relevant committee with a statement that we have complied with relevant ethical requirements regarding independence, and to communicate with them all relationships and other matters that may reasonably be thought to bear on our independence, and where applicable, actions taken to eliminate threats or safeguards applied.



KPMG AG

Toni Wattenhofer
Licensed Audit Expert
Auditor in Charge

Anna Pohle
Licensed Audit Expert

Zug, 18 February 2025